Are conscientious objectors morally obligated to refer?

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

8-1-2022

Publication Title

Journal of medical ethics

Abstract

In this paper, we argue that providers who conscientiously refuse to provide legal and professionally accepted medical care are not always morally required to refer their patients to willing providers. Indeed, we will argue that refusing to refer is morally admirable in certain instances. In making the case, we show that belief in a sweeping moral duty to refer depends on an implicit assumption that the procedures sanctioned by legal and professional norms are ethically permissible. Focusing on examples of female genital cutting, clitoridectomy and 'normalizing' surgery for children with intersex traits, we argue that this assumption is untenable and that providers are not morally required to refer when refusing to perform genuinely unethical procedures. The fact that acceptance of our thesis would force us to face the challenge of distinguishing between ethical and unethical medical practices is a virtue. This is the central task of medical ethics, and we must confront it rather than evade it.

Volume

48

Issue

8

First Page

547

Last Page

550

DOI

10.1136/medethics-2020-107025

ISSN

1473-4257

PubMed ID

34233957

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